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The Sunni-Shia Political 
Struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
Thomas G. Cardinali, Morgan L.A. Murray 
 
The tense relationship between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran is founded on opposing 
sentiments, including religious and 
economic differences, which have impacted 
the United States in various ways. Saudi 
Arabia is primarily comprised of Sunni 
Muslims while Iran is predominately 
comprised of Shia Muslims, causing an 
immediate aversion between the countries. 
Although both are sects of Islam, they 
oppose each other on a key issue that is the 
foundation for the constant tension between 
the two countries. 
 
Shiites make up approximately 10 to 15 
percent of the global Muslim population, but 
in the Middle East they are predominate in 
Iran’s population.164 Sunnis are the 
subsequent majority and enjoy primary 
influence over Saudi Arabia.165 The 
divergence between Shiites and Sunnis 
dates back seventeen hundred years at the 
choosing of the Prophet Mohammed’s 
successor.166 Shiites believe that Islam's 
leader should be a direct male descendant 
of the Prophet while Sunnis contest that 
leaders can be chosen by the community 
consensus.167  
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The foremost points of contention between 
Iranian and Saudi Arabian relations are the 
manipulation of jihad as an intercultural 
weapon, attempted Saudi domination of the 
Middle Eastern world, and the fight to 
control economic growth. These primary 
issues are affected by the underlying 
religious tension, and have the capacity to 
affect the United States. Although the two 
countries may choose to downplay the core 
issues, the differences are quite 
recognizable. Even as then-president 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sat next to King 
Abdulla of Saudi Arabia during the 
Organization of Islamic Corporation, held in 
Mecca in August 2012, there was 
underlying tension beneath the veneer of 
shared Islamic unity.168 
 Iran has the ability to religiously 
influence Shiite Arabs across the Middle 
East, just as Saudis influence the Sunni 
communities.169 Iran and Saudi Arabia 
rarely go head to head; instead, they use 
Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Afghanistan and 
Yemen as their battlegrounds.170 Saudi 
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Arabia and Iran place their militaries on high 
alert, pursue nuclear power, and work 
through proxy politicians, as well as covert 
militias; activities that are intended to 
undermine each other politically as a 
regional power.171 
In 2006, during the Israeli-Lebanon 
War, both Iran and Saudi Arabia backed 
factions and used Lebanon as a proxy war 
territory. During this war, Iran’s President 
Ahmadinejad openly challenged Saudi 
Arabia’s monarchy while at the same time 
Saudi Arabia grew wary of the growing Shia 
community in Iraq. Saudi Arabia now 
launches military aerial raids on Shia Houthi 
rebels located in Northern Yemen,172 which 
can be viewed as Saudi Arabia flexing its 
military might as a warning to Shia 
communities. Saudi Arabia also exhibits its 
strong arm in the area of energy by 
proposing counter offers to Iran’s primary 
partner, China. In January 2013, Saudi 
Arabia stated that they planned to use the 
internal chaos of Iran’s impeding collapse of 
the Bashar al Assad regime in Damascus in 
an attempt to oust Iran from the Sunni Arab 
stage.173 
 In an effort to enhance national 
security against Hezbollah and other 
potentially dangerous groups, the U.S. has 
taken a strong interest in its policy regarding 
the Middle East. Iran has not made their 
motives clear regarding their intent in post-
Saddam Iraq, and for obtaining nuclear 
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weapons. These uncertainties leave the 
United States in a position to formulate a 
policy that either endorses Saudi Arabia or 
places restrictions on its relationship with 
Iran. This endorsement is not so much an 
approval of Saudi Arabian policy but instead 
a support of the Kingdom as a balance of 
Arab power against Iran.174 Supporting 
Saudi Arabia can effectively serve as a 
method to oppose Iran, due to the friction 
that already exists from the Sunni-Shi’a 
divide. The countries will continuously 
confront each other for Middle Eastern 
dominance, which will make it extremely 
difficult for Iran to achieve their desire for 
supremacy. Should this strategy prove 
successful, the threat of nuclear weapons 
will decrease and U.S. strategic investment 
in the Middle East will grow increasingly 
difficult in balancing between both Iran and 
Saudi Arabia. The U.S. must continue 
relations with both countries, as Middle 
Eastern power and dominance can have 
national security implications for the United 
States based on the potential development 
of nuclear weapons and Middle Eastern 
countries serving as breeding grounds for 
terrorist organizations.  Furthering domestic 
oil production and continued importation of 
oil from Canada and Latin America will 
persist in the reduction of oil obtained from 
the Middle East and further protect the U.S. 
from the religious, geographic, and 
economic conflict that could prove harmful 
to the economy and national security in the 
United States.  This economic leverage 
could also escalate force towards 
preventing nuclear weapons from settling in 
oil-rich regions where Hezbollah and Al-
Qaeda have established themselves. 
Both Saudi Arabia and Iran profit 
immensely from the oil industry. The Middle 
East produces an overwhelming amount of 
oil and acquires significant revenue from its 
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oil exports. The success from the oil 
industry leads to strong competition 
between oil producing countries and 
conflicting agendas related to the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). OPEC’s official 
description is “a permanent 
intergovernmental organization of 12 oil-
exporting developing nations that 
coordinates and unifies the petroleum 
policies of its Member Countries.”175 Over 
80 percent of the world’s oil is located in an 
OPEC country which means that OPEC 
also has the potential to impact economies 
around the world due to its goal of 
stabilizing the oil market.176  Since the U.S. 
is dependent on oil, they also have a vested 
interest in OPEC and the activities of its 
member countries. 
 As a result of OPEC attempting to 
stabilize the market, all countries within the 
organization must be in agreement on items 
such as level of production and market 
price. Historically, Iran and Saudi Arabia 
have had opposing views regarding these 
issues, but other OPEC countries usually 
choose to side with Saudi Arabia, mainly in 
part because they are the world’s largest 
petroleum exporter and hold 18 percent of 
the world’s proven petroleum reserves.177 
This makes Saudi Arabia a strong leader in 
the organization, much to the distaste of the 
Iranians. In one instance, Saudi Arabia 
wanted to increase the level of production, 
which the Iranians opposed, and to the 
surprise of the Saudis, the other countries 
sided with Iran.178 This was a result of 
smaller oil producers not being able to 
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increase oil production at the same rate as 
Saudi Arabia.179 This outcome only added to 
the mutual distaste between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia and increased the overall rivalry 
between the countries. 
 The religious struggle between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran is one that has the 
potential to affect not only those particular 
countries, but also the rest of the world. The 
two Muslim rivals clash over religious and 
economic issues; with each strategically 
contending to be the Middle Eastern 
powerhouse. The religious divide constantly 
affects the relationship between Hezbollah 
and Al Qaeda do to their Sunni/Shia divide 
that not only puts them at odds with the 
U.S., but with each other.  The ties that 
these organizations have with each other 
could strengthen one another and even 
encourage the transformation of attacks by 
Hezbollah in order to strike outside their 
normal borders and attack the U.S.180  
Additionally, their conflict can put the U.S. in 
a situation where some direct or indirect 
involvement in the conflict is necessary in 
order to protect from enemies grasping 
greater control of the Middle East.  The two 
organizations’ power struggle in Syria is a 
prime example.   
These differences between nations 
could have a detrimental impact on the 
safety of the United States from both a 
security and economic standpoint. Although 
the religious divide is one that will likely 
never be solved, it can, however, be 
contained and prevented from negatively 
impacting the rest of the world which is why 
the U.S. continues to search for appropriate 
policy regarding the Middle East.  
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